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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state 
of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power.1 
The current global transnational society is composed of a variety of actors. Traditional 
state actors in a Westphalian sense,2 are no longer the sole actors in international 
relations (the global arena): non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)3, as well as transnational corporations (TNCs)4, play an increasingly 
                                                
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1977) at 201. 
2 D Stirk, “The Westphalian Model, Sovereignty and Law in Fin-de-siècle German International 
Theory” (2005) 19:2 International Relations 153 at 168; Y H Ferguson & R W Mansbach, Remapping 
Global Politics: History’s revenge and future shock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 
55–56. 
3 The term ‘Non-governmental organizations’ as will be used here refers to organizations which have 
the following five elements: first, NGOs are private structures in the sense that they are not established 
or dominated by states (which distinguishes them from Intergovernmental Organisations); second, their 
goal is not to replace governments by force (as opposed to national liberation movements and armed 
opposition groups); third, while NGOs can aspire to alter governmental policy, they do not seek to take 
control over the government themselves (as opposed to political parties and movements); fourth, NGOs 
are non-self-profitable organizations, even though they can employ fundraising and even marketing 
(unlike business entities); and finally, even though some NGOs can sometimes employ civil 
disobedience, they are mostly law abiding (as opposed to criminal groups). Menno T Kamminga, “The 
evolving status of NGOs under international Law: A threat to the inter-state system” in Philip Alston, 
ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 93 at 96.. 
4 The terms transnational corporations, multinational corporations (MNCs), multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), global enterprises, and multinationals are used interchangeably in the literature, sometimes 
with differences between them. As there is no single definition in the literature, for the purposes of this 
paper, the definition of the UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations will be used:  
[A]n enterprise, whether of public, private or mixed ownership, comprising entities in two or 
more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which 
operates under a system of decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by 
ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them [may be able to] exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and 
responsibilities with the others.  
David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regard to human rights” (2003) 97:4 American Journal of International 
Law 901 at 907–909; Jonathan I Charney, “Transnational Corporations and Developing Public 
International Law” (1983) Duke Law Journal 748 at 749; Fleur E Johns, “The Invisibility of the 
Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory” (1994) 19 Melbourne 
University Law Review 893 at 893; Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 
Second Edition ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 5–6; Tania Voon, “Multinational 
Enterprises and State Sovereignty under International Law” (1999) 21 The Adelaide Law Review 219 
at 220. 
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important role in international relations and politics.  5  International law continues to 
set the standard of behaviour and rationalization for the legality of state actions. 
This article explores the influence of transnational actors on compliance with 
international legal rules, as part of Foucault’s power/knowledge6 structure. In 
particular the article examines the effect of the ‘Shooting Back’7 project, initiated by 
the Israeli NGO ‘B’Tselem the Israeli Center for Human Rights’ (hereinafter 
B’Tselem), on the level of investigations of alleged violations of the law of 
occupation in the ‘Occupied Territories’ (hereinafter OT). This article does not 
purport to present the entire complexity of Foucault’s work on power/knowledge,8 but 
rather to apply and transfer the inherent notion of resistance therein onto the increased 
ability of NGOs in a transnational society to acquire power through the spread of 
knowledge. The focus of this article will be on the mechanisms of power rather than 
on the definition of power.9 The relations of power, as developed in an information-
driven world, are multiform and are not found in a dichotomous relationship between 
                                                
5 Steven R Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111:3 
Yale Law Journal 443 at 446–448; Voon, supra note 4 at 221; James N Rosenau, Turbulence in World 
Politics: A theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 6; 
Ferguson & Mansbach, supra note 2 at 2; Emeka Duruigbo, “Corporate Accountability and Liability 
for International Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges” (2008) 6 Nw U J 
Int’l Hum Rts 222 at 224; Johns, supra note 4 at 893; Olga Martin-Ortega, “Business and Human 
Rights in Conflict” (2008) 22:3 Ethics & International Affairs 273 at 274; Pini Pavel Miretski, “The 
Influence of Non-Governmental Actors on Compliance with International Law - Compliance with 
UNSC Decisions on Angola’s Conflict Diamonds” in Noëlle Quénivet & Shilan Shah-Davis, eds, 
International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Instituut, 2010) 208 at 208–210. 
6 James F Keeley, “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes” (1990) 44:1 International 
Organization 83 at 84–85; Barbara Townley, “Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and Its Relevance for 
Human Resource Management” (1993) 18:3 The Academy of Management Review 518 at 521–523. 
7 This project has later been renamed as the ‘camera distribution project’, and the two terms will be 
used interchangeably in this paper. 
8 This article focuses on the genealogical period of Foucault, and in light of its limited scope does not 
include the analysis of Foucault’s work on the subject of governmentality. David Knights, “Writing 
Organizational Analysis into Foucault” (2002) 9:4 Organization 575 at 578; Gibson Burrell, 
“Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: The Contribution of Michel Foucault” in 
Alan Mckinlay & Ken Starkey, eds, Foucault, Management and Organization Theory: From 
Panopticon to Technologies of Self (London: SAGE, 2000) 14; Arnold I Davidson, “Ethics as ascetics: 
Foucault, the history of ethics, and ancient thought” in Gary Gutting, ed, The Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 115 at 118.  
9 Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-77 by Michel 
Foucault, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 51. 
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the dominator and dominated.10 Therefore knowledge provided by third parties, 
including transnational actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in the field of the media, which influence and to a 
large degree control the flow of knowledge in a transnational society, 11 may influence 
the manifestation and experience of power and can even assist in conflict resolution. 
This, in turn, empowers transnational actors, as they are able to impact on the array of 
available knowledge in the system.12  
Bentham stated that the two main principles of power are that it should be 
visible and unverifiable.13 However, one may ponder whether these principles can be 
applied to the concept of power in the international arena? In today’s global world, 
there is a constant increase in availability of sources of information and knowledge 
due to widely available technological developments in the communications sector. 
This wide spread of technology, however, at times may make it necessary for states to 
limit access to such ‘public’ information in order to restrict the overall visibility of 
their own actions.14 Alternatively, states might opt to provide own ways of providing 
                                                
10 Leonard M Hammer, A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive Thoughts for 
Normative Issues (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) at 46. 
11 Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?” (1999) 25:02 
Review of International Studies 301 at 301; Piers Robinson, The CNN effect: the myth of news, foreign 
policy and intervention (London: Routledge, 2002) at 1–2; Clifford Bob, “Merchants of Morality” 
(2002):129 Foreign Policy 36 at 38. 
12 Tanja A Börzel, T Hoffman & C Sprungk, Why Do States not Obey the Law? Lessons from the 
European Union (Nashville, 2003) at 15–16; Jonas Tallberg, “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, 
Management, and the European Union” (2002) 56:3 International Organization 609 at 611; D A Lake 
& R Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach” in D A Lake & R Powell, eds, 
Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 3 at 38–39. 
One must note, however, that unlike the Foucauldian approach these theories see knowledge and power 
as analytically distinct terminuses. The use of conclusions from these approaches to enrich the 
conclusions of the Foucauldian approach should therefore be done carefully.  
13 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon, or, The inspection-house (Dublin: Payne, 1791) at 23–27; Foucault, 
supra note 1 at 201. 
14 While Bentham’s work produced many valuable insights and laid many important foundations for 
various fields, including international law, this article is limited to Bentham’s principles of panopticon 
which are interpreted mainly in line with Foucault’s work. E J Ziede, “In Bed with the Military: First 
Amendment Implications of Embedded Journalism” (2005) 80 New York University Law Review 1309 
at 1310; Foreign Press Association v. GOC Southern Command, major-general Yoav Galant, 2008 
9910/08 (available on http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Bagatz-foreign-press-1-.pdf); Rory 
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information as part of a counter information campaign.15 Still, even in a reality where 
one might expect that a state would have total control over the flow of information, 
like in the context of combat during armed conflict, a (democratic) state’s options of 
actually reducing visibility, and subsequent exposure of its military actions are 
becoming increasingly constrained in today’s globalized and transnational society. 
The actual presence of global NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International, even in the most remote parts of the world, combined with the 
availability of cheap and easily attainable means of communication provided by 
media and technology TNCs, create the abovementioned visibility effect. The 
increasing spread of technology accessible to the individual end-user, such as cell 
phones and internet access enable individual participants to broadcast their point of 
view to a wide global audience.  
The second principle of power, ‘un-verifiability’ is implemented and 
demonstrated by the ‘Shooting Back’ project of the Israeli human rights NGO 
B’Tselem.16 In January 2007, B’Tselem provided Palestinians living in high-conflict 
areas with video cameras in order to capture, expose, and ‘seek redress for’ human 
rights violations in the OT. This project, once publicised, increased the awareness of 
soldiers and mainly their commanders to the possibility of being monitored and 
                                                                                                                                       
McCarthy, “Foreign journalists demand Gaza access”, Guardian.co.uk (30 December 2008), online: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/30/israel-gaza-journalists/print>. 
15 Matthew Kalman & Noah Smith, “Israeli army launches camera combat unit – video”, The Guardian 
(23 January 2014), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jan/23/israeli-army-
combat-cameras-unit-video>; The Associated Press, “IDF soldiers may take cameras to war to stave off 
international criticism”, Haaretz.com (11 April 2011), online: 
<http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/idf-soldiers-may-take-cameras-to-war-to-stave-off-
international-criticism-1.355390>. 
16 Yuval Azoulay, “B’Tselem cameras pay off for victims of settler attacks”, Haaretz (17 June 2008), 
online: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/993346.html>; Amy Goodman, “Shooting Back: The 
Israeli Human Rights Group B’Tselem Gives Palestinians Video Cameras to Document Life Under 
Occupation.”, (26 December 2007), online: Democracy Now! The War and Peace Report 
<http://www.democracynow.org/2007/12/26/shooting_back_the_israeli_human_rights>. But see 
Gerald M Steinberg, “Bad Timing: B’tselem And The Durban Conference”, The Jewish Week (30 
December 2008), online: 
<http://www.thejewishweek.com/viewArticle/c55_a14420/Editorial__Opinion/Opinion.html#>. 
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filmed, without always knowing the exact source of the filming. This awareness 
increased self-discipline of soldiers and commanders alike. The filming materials 
even assisted the internal disciplinary and judicial mechanisms of the ‘Israeli Defence 
Forces’ (hereinafter IDF) in investigating potential violations when suspicions 
surfaced. 
This article postulates the notion that transnational non-state actors can 
influence the considerations of decision makers of state actors in the context of 
compliance with international law and can potentially play a wider role within the 
enforcement structure of international law. The latter role of non-state actors may 
involve monitoring and revealing the identities of violators of said rules by way of 
naming and shaming. If the basic condition of the international legal system is 
anarchy, which stipulates the absence of a supreme law maker, a top-down set of laws 
and a structured enforcement mechanism,17 at least the latter may slowly be changing 
as the global political arena is developing from an international system to a 
transnational society. The recognition and inclusion of transnational non-state actors 
in the enforcement of international law may be another bulding block in remedying 
the general enforcement deficit of international law. Non-state actors may increase 
compliance with international legal rules by means of additional compliance 
incentives such as naming and shaming, surveillance, publicity and visibility.  
This article introduces the reader to B’Tselem’s camera distribution project 
within a discussion of the concepts of power, power/knowledge and panoptism, 
                                                
17The term ‘anarchy’ refers here to a lack of centralized government, and not to a lack of order. The 
term is characteristically used in International Relations scholarship to describe a system with order and 
rules despite the lack of a supreme sovereign. Generally on anarchy as used in IR scholarship see Helen 
Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” (1991) 17:1 
Review of International Studies 67 at 69–71; Alex Wendt, “Anarchy is What States make of It: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics” (1992) 46:2 IO 391. On enforcement under the conditions of 
anarchy see Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Company Inc., 
1952) at 18–19; Thomas M Franck, The Power of legitimacy among nations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) at 1–16. 
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according to Foucault’s conceptual framework and its implementation in 
organizational studies. Within this context, the paper explores the role of transnational 
actors in testing and applying the panoptic structure of international law by using the 
Israeli ‘Shooting Back’ project as an example. 
II. ‘SHOOTING BACK’ PROJECT 
B’Tselem is an Israeli NGO focusing on the collection, analysis and provision of 
information about human rights in the OT, in order to educate (first and foremost the 
Israeli) public and policy makers. While B’Tselem is primarily an Israeli NGO, it has 
several characteristics making it, in fact, a transnational organisation as well. First, 
while focusing on the Israeli public and policy makers, B’Tselem is also an actor in 
the transnational arena, making information available to all those interested. Hence, 
and since US foreign policy plays a vital role in shaping Israel's policies in the 
Occupied Territories, B’Tselem has an office in Washington, DC.18 Furthermore, a 
significant part of the funding of the organisation comes from European governments 
and foundations from Europe and North America.19  
In January 2007 B’Tselem launched its camera distribution project. This 
project was defined by them as a video advocacy project focusing on the OT.20 The 
organization provided video cameras to Palestinians living in high-conflict areas. One 
of the core strategies of the project was distributing cameras to ‘passive’ civilians, 
rather than known activists, as part of the passive image making concept.21 The goal 
of the project, as published on the website of the organization, was: ‘bringing the 
reality of their [Palestinians] lives under occupation to the attention of the Israeli and 
                                                
18 “B’Tselem USA”,, online: <http://www.btselem.org/usa>. 
19 “About B’Tselem”,, online: <http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem>. 
20 B’Tselem, “B’Tselem Video - Camera distribution project”, (21 November 2009), online: 
<http://www.btselem.org/english/Video/CDP_Background.asp>. 
21 Yoav Gross, Personal interview with B’Tselem’s Video Coordinator (2009). 
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international public, exposing and seeking redress for violations of human rights.’22 
Three factors caused B’Tselem to initiate the project – frustration from the inability to 
document the violations they were aware of, due to limited resources; the desire to 
enlarge the audience aware of the violations; and the will to promote law 
enforcement.23 B’Tselem, as of November 2009, provided over 150 cameras to 
individuals and families living in the West Bank and Gaza, focusing, in particular, on 
the region of Hebron and the South Hills.24  
The project was managed by the video department of the organization. This 
department was originally established for providing information on the activities of 
the organization to the public and advocating B’Tselem’s activities in the media. 
Later, and partly due to the success of the ‘Shooting Back’ project, the video 
department began focusing more on supplying information which can later be used as 
evidence in investigations conducted by enforcement authorities and in judiciary 
proceedings.25 Both, Yoav Gross the video coordinator of B’Tselem and Oren 
Yakobovich, the director of the department at B’Tselem, emphasized in interviews 
that every time his organization submitted a report to the IDF they received a quick 
response, which was consequently published by B’Tselem, along with the report. 
Gross also pointed out that both the army and the police were encouraging the 
organization to film the violations witnessed.26 Gross also pointed out that once the 
project was well established, intelligence bodies of the army and the police often 
contact him directly, as soon as there are rumours of an incident in the OT, inquiring 
                                                
22 B’Tselem, supra note 20. 
23 Gross, supra note 21. 
24 Babelmed, “Shooting Back in Palestine: when cameras become weapons | Mediterranean | Culture et 
politique en Méditerranée: information et identité Méditerranéennes avec Babelmed”, (14 November 
2009), online: 
<http://www.babelmed.net/Countries/Mediterranean/shooting_back.php?c=3757&m=9&l=en>; 
Azoulay, supra note 16; Gross, supra note 21. 
25 Gross, supra note 21. 
26 Goodman, supra note 16; Gross, supra note 21. 
THE PANOPTICON OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
9  
 
whether B’Tselem possesses video documentation.27 In June 2009, the ‘Shooting 
Back’ project received the British One World Media Award in the field of citizen 
journalism.28  
Among the most publicized incidents, documented as a result of the project 
was the first video received,  when Rajah Abu Aisha of Hebron videotaped his Jewish 
neighbour, Yifat Alkobi, verbally assaulting his wife, including calling her a slut, 
without any response from a soldier that was standing nearby.29 However, what is 
probably the most famous incident documented in the scope of the project was the 
case of Ashraf Abu Rahma, a Palestinian protester against the separation barrier in 
Ni’ilin.30 Abu Rahma was arrested during a routine demonstration on 7 July 2008. 
After being handcuffed and blindfolded, he was led by the arm by Lt. Colonel Omri 
Borberg and ordered to remain standing next to a military jeep. Afterwards, an 
exchange between the officer and a soldier, of something similar to the following took 
place. The officer asked the soldier in Hebrew:”What do you say, shall we take him 
aside and ’‘shoot rubber’’ at him”? The soldier responded, also in Hebrew: ”I have no 
problem shooting at him”. The officer then instructed the soldier to load the bullet and 
the soldier responded that he had already done so. The soldier then aimed his weapon 
                                                
27 Gross, supra note 21. 
28 B’Tselem, “B’Tselem - Press Releases - 23 June ‘09: B’Tselem’s video camera distribution project 
wins British One World Media award”, (21 November 2009), online: 
<http://www.btselem.org/english/press_releases/20090623.asp>. 
29 Azoulay, supra note 16; Goodman, supra note 16; Gross, supra note 21; Babelmed, supra note 24. 
30 Orna Ben-Naftali & Noam Zamir, “Whose ‘Conduct Unbecoming’?: The Shooting of a Handcuffed, 
Blindfolded Palestinian Demonstrator” (2009) J Int Criminal Justice, online: 
<http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/mqp012v1>; Peter Beaumont, “Story behind the 
shot protester and the teen who caught it on film | World news | The Observer”, Guardian.co.uk (26 
July 2008), online: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/27/israelandthepalestinians.middleeast>; Azoulay, supra 
note 16; Peter Beaumont, Video: Israeli occupation filmed by 100 Palestinian cameras | World news | 
guardian.co.uk (Guardian, 2008); Ashraf Abu Rahma vs. The Judge Advocate General, 2009 
HCJ7195/08. 
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at the protester’s legs and fired a rubber-coated steel bullet, a shrapnel of which hit 
Abu Rahma’s left toe.  31  
This incident was filmed by a Palestinian girl Salaam Amira from Ni’ilin from 
the window of her home.32 According to Gross, B’Tselem’s video coordinator, the 
value of this footage was not immediately comprehended. A copy of the tape was 
transferred to International Solidarity volunteers, and was later given to Al-Jazeera, 
who dismissed the value of broadcasting this video.33 The footage was published by 
B’Tselem on 20 July, a day after they received the copy of the video and thoroughly 
checked the facts and the authenticity of the video.34 Following the publication, 
B’Tselem presented the information to military police,  35 and demanded opening an 
investigation, and bringing the officer and the soldier involved in the incident to 
justice. Following the investigation, the Military Advocate General (MAG) decided to 
prosecute both the officer and the soldier for ‘conduct unbecoming’, a minor offense 
that holds no criminal record. According to the indictment, the officer intended to 
                                                
31 Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 30; Ashraf Abu Rahma vs. The Judge Advocate General, supra 
note 30; אס דגנ יאבצה עבותה“מסו גרברוב ירמוע ל”ודרנואל הארוק ר ,2010 /מ5/08  (available on 
http://www.btselem.org/Hebrew/Legal_Documents/20100715_Nilin_verdict_heb.pdf) at 45–46. 
32 Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 30 at 4. But see Beaumont, supra note 30; Beaumont, supra note 
30. 
33 Gross, supra note 21. 
34 Soon after the video was released, in a demonstration against the separation barrier in Ni’ilin, the 
father of Salaam Amira was arrested and charged with violation of an enclosed military space, 
participation in a protest, and assaulting a soldier. However, the Judea and Samaria Military Court of 
Appeals released him due to lack in evidence, and criticized the obvious connection to the filming, 
when asked ‘Why was the father of the girl arrested out of all those protesting at the time?’ Ben-Naftali 
& Zamir, supra note 30 at 4; Dan Izenberg, “Military court orders father of Ni’lin video whistleblower 
released. Jamal Amira accused of hitting soldier. Son says he was arrested because of film showing 
IDF shooting”, The Jerusalem Post (19 August 2008), online: 
<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/1535916671.html?dids=1535916671:1535916671&FMT=A
BS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+19%2C+2008&author=DAN+IZENBERG&pub=Jerusalem+Post&e
dition=&startpage=5&desc=Military+court+orders+father+of+Ni%27lin+video+whistleblower+release
d.+Jamal+Amira+accused+of+hitting+soldier.+Son+says+he+was+arrested+because+of+film+showin
g+IDF+shooting>; Ali Waked, “Military judge: Naalin arrest unfounded - Israel News, Ynetnews”, 
Ynet (17 August 2008), online: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3583912,00.html>; 
Gross, supra note 21; ג’נ הרימע ילע ןיסח לאמ ’תיאבצה העיבתה ,2008  מע3938/08 .  
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threaten the detainee, while the soldier misunderstood his intentions.  36 On 19 August 
2008 an urgent appeal on the MAG’s decision was filed with the Israeli High Court of 
Justice (hereinafter HCJ). In light of the appeal, the HCJ issued an interim injunction 
deferring the proceedings. In September, following a hearing on the case, the Court 
ordered the MAG to reconsider his indictment and to inform the Court of his decision, 
using the occasion to criticise the judgement of the MAG in this case.37 The 
subsequent decision of the MAG to indict simply for ‘conduct unbecoming’38 caused 
the HCJ to issue a judgment on 1 July 2009, in which the MAG’s decision was openly 
criticized (Justice Rubinstein even called the MAG’s decision blasphemy) and 
dismissed. Furthermore, the HCJ requested that both the soldier and the officer were 
to be indicted for more serious offenses.39 In September 2009 the trial of the two 
began, with Lt. Colonel Borberg being charged with ‘threats’ in addition to ‘conduct 
unbecoming’ and First Sergeant Korea, being charged with both ‘conduct 
unbecoming’ and ‘illegal use of firearms’.40 On 15 July 2010, both Lt. Colonel 
Borberg and First Sergeant Korea were found guilty as charged.41 However, despite 
the clear denunciations used in the verdict to describe the incident and the behaviour 
of the defendants, as well as the special attention given to the damage the incident 
                                                
36 Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 30 at 4; Ashraf Abu Rahma vs. The Judge Advocate General, supra 
note 30; אס דגנ יאבצה עבותה“מסו גרברוב ירמוע ל”ודרנואל הארוק ר , supra note 31 at 4–5. 
37 Ashraf Abu Rahma vs. The Judge Advocate General, supra note 30; Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra 
note 30 at 5. 
38 Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 30 at 5; B’Tselem, “B’Tselem - Use of Firearms - 4 Nov.‘08: Judge 
Advocate General informs the High Court that he will not amend the indictment in the shooting of a 
bound Palestinian in Ni’lin”, (21 November 2009), online: 
<http://www.btselem.org/english/firearms/20081104_nilin_state_response.asp>. 
39 Ashraf Abu Rahma vs. The Judge Advocate General, supra note 30. 
40 IDF Mag Corps, “IDF Mag Corps”, (24 September 2009), online: IDF Mag Corps - News 
<http://www.law.idf.il/164-3439-
he/Patzar.aspx?SearchText=%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%92>; Anshil 
Peper, “  אל גרברוב ל"אס :העיבתהןילענב תופכ ןיגפמב ימוג רודכ תוריל הרוה ”, Haaretz.com (25 
September 2009), online: 
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=1116799&contrassID=0&subContrassID=
9>. 
41  אס דגנ יאבצה עבותה“מסו גרברוב ירמוע ל”ודרנואל הארוק ר , supra note 31. 
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caused to the public image of Israel, moderate sentences were issued with regard to 
both of them.42  
This case, as well as a number of similar others, including the case of Yifat 
Alkobi, emphasise one significant effect of the camera distribution project: visibility 
which subsequently brings the exposure of potential offenses committed by the 
military under the veil of state security. The presence of cameras in high-conflict 
areas presents a new dimension of visibility, not known before. Yakobovich, the 
director of the video department at B’Tselem, focused on power and transparency 
when he described the ‘Shooting Back’ project:  
It’s giving power. You know, this word is called ‘empowerment.’ I don’t like 
this word so much, but I will use it. It’s the children and the kids are filming. 
It’s helping to mobilize communities. In Hebron, where the community was 
destroyed, suddenly they’re filming and they have some kind of an interest in 
seeing the videos, talking about it. And what I hope to achieve, that everything 
is going to be filmed, at least [that] ... there’s going to be a feeling that 
everything is being filmed, nothing is being done in the dark. And this is what 
B’Tselem was basically established for, to bring light to places that are in the 
dark so violation will not occur. [Emphasis added].  43  
III. POWER, KNOWLEDGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF A PANOPTICON 
In order to understand the role of non-state actors in the power/knowledge structure of 
international law, it is helpful initially to discuss briefly the concepts of power, and 
                                                
42 Elior Levy, “Palestinians slam Borberg sentence”, Ynet (27 January 2011), online: 
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4020125,00.html>; Ori Lewis, “No Jail for Israel 
Soldiers who Shot Palestinian”, Reuters (27 January 2011), online: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/27/us-palestinians-israel-sentences-
idUSTRE70Q6CT20110127>; אס דגנ יאבצה עבותה“מסו גרברוב ירמוע ל”ודרנואל הארוק ר ,2011 
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the related power/knowledge structure. Since Foucault’s analysis of power was not 
intended to define power, but only to suggest where we should find it, instead of using 
a single definition of power, we can but elaborate on some of its characteristics.44 This 
analysis will be based on the later, so called genealogical period of Foucault.  45 The 
issues explored by Foucault during this period, included the relationship between 
power and knowledge and the ‘genealogy’ of ”organizations [as] social machines 
which produce elaborate discourses of information/knowledge in which human 
subject are a necessary part of the material flow on which the discourses are 
inscribed”.46 
A. The concept of Power and Power/Knowledge according to Foucault 
Power for Foucault was not a unitary concept, but an infinitely complex network of 
‘micro-powers’ and power relations that permeate every aspect of social life.47 It is 
not localized in a single place, nor can it be acquired as wealth or a commodity.48 
Power does not have a subject.49 Its objects are data, information and the power to 
evaluate information.50 Power is not static, rather it and its application are subject to 
constant change and alteration.51 Power is part of an on-going and ever-changing 
relationship of resistance and the assertion of power.52It is not vested only in the state, 
                                                
44 Thomas E Wartenberg, Rethinking power (SUNY Press, 1992) at 51. 
45 Alan McKinlay & Ken Starkey, “Managing Foucault: Foucault, Management and Organization 
Theory” in Alan Mckinlay & Ken Starkey, eds, Foucault, Management and Organization Theory: 
From Panopticon to Technologies of Self (London: SAGE, 2000) 1 at 1; Knights, supra note 8 at 578; 
Burrell, supra note 8 at 14–21. 
46 McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 45 at 1. 
47 Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (New-York: Tavistock Publications, 1984) at 
139,183. See also Stewart Clegg, “Foucault, Power and Organizations” in Alan Mckinlay & Ken 
Starkey, eds, Foucault, Management and Organization Theory: From Panopticon to Technologies of 
Self (London: SAGE, 2000) 29 at 31. 
48 Michel Foucault, “Society must be defended”:lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, translated 
by David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2003) at 29; Sheridan, supra note 47 at 184. 
49 Wartenberg, supra note 44 at 51. 
50 Larry Catá Backer, “Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects of 
Monitoring Regimes” (2008) 15:1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 101 at 128. 
51 Hammer, supra note 10 at 42. 
52 Ibid at 47. 
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but rather it is an ongoing form of relationship between various social forces and 
actors that tend to influence and shape state decisions.53 Foucault said in one of his 
lectures: ”power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply 
circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this 
power.”54 B’Tselem‘s ‘Shooting Back’ project exemplifies that through the usage of 
technology and knowledge, as the traditionally ‘inferior’ actor - an occupied 
population, can, at times, overcome the far more superior actor - an established 
occupying power.  
For Foucault, power and knowledge were inseparable.55 For him, the exercise 
of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly brings 
about effects of power. Knowledge and power are mixed with one another, and it is 
not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, just as it is impossible for 
knowledge not to give rise to power.56 Truth and knowledge are in fact weapons by 
which a society manages itself.57 As will be presented below in the analysis of the 
abovementioned case of Ashraf Abu Rahma, B’Tselem’s ‘Shooting Back’ project 
provides an example of knowledge allowing a civil population to defend itself against 
the possibility of violations of the law of occupation by the occupying power.  
                                                
53 Ibid at 44. 
54 Foucault, supra note 48 at 29. 
55 This is mainly true in regard to his later works, while in the early ones, one can find different 
interpretation. Townley, supra note 6 at 521. 
56 Foucault, supra note 9 at 51–52; Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge (New 
York: Other Press, 2006) at 113; Sheridan, supra note 47 at 138–140; Townley, supra note 6 at 521. In 
Foucault’s words: “No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, 
records, accumulation and displacement, which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its 
existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without 
the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is not 
knowledge on the one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the fundamental 
forms of knowledge/power.” Sheridan, supra note 47 at 131. 
57 McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 45 at 1. 
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Data itself is inert prior to being used. However the use of that data creates 
knowledge and that is the exercise of power.58 Foucault argued that not only is 
knowledge always a form of power, but power is implicated in the questions of 
whether and under what circumstances knowledge is to be applied.  59 As others 
exercise power, one’s knowledge changes, which, in turn, will influence the 
individual’s own use of power.60 While we acknowledge that the knowledge of human 
rights violations committed in the OT, gained within the scope of B’Tselem’s 
‘Shooting Back’ project, will not always lead to actual enforcement action (contrary 
to the abovementioned case of Abu Rahma) we contend that it may contribute to the 
existing general knowledge of the situation, and hence on the exercise of power. 
B. Panoptism 
The ensemble of various mechanisms brought into play in all different clusters of 
power, is perhaps best seen in the ‘Panopticon’61The principle of the Panopticon was:  
A perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the centre of this structure, a 
tower, pierced by large windows opening on to the inner face of the ring. The 
outer building is divided into cells each of which traverses the whole thickness 
of the building. These cells have two windows, one opening on to the inside, 
facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight 
to pass through the whole cell. All that is then needed is to put an overseer in 
the tower and place in each of the cells a lunatic, a patient, a convict, a worker, 
or a schoolboy. The back lighting enables one to pick out from the central tower 
the little captive silhouettes in the ring of the cells. In short, the principle of the 
dungeon is reversed: daylight and the overseer’s gazer capture the inmate more 
effectively than darkness, which afforded after all a sort of protection.62 
                                                
58 Backer, supra note 50 at 126; Sheridan, supra note 47 at 220. 
59 Stuart Hall & Open University, Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices 
(SAGE, 1997) at 48. 
60 Hammer, supra note 10 at 46. 
61 Bentham, supra note 13; Foucault, supra note 9 at 71. 
62 Foucault, supra note 9 at 147; Bentham, supra note 13 at 5–12. 
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Jeremy Bentham’s concept of Panoptism was arguably, as Bentham himself 
defined it, the ‘Columbus’s egg in the order of politics’.63 Panoptism was a 
technological invention in the order of power, comparable with the steam engine in 
the order of production, as it automates and dis-individualizes power.64 Power in the 
Panopticon does not depend solely on an individual person, but rather it is a certain 
concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, and gazes, which produce the 
relations in which individuals are caught by. The Panopticon is a machine which 
produces homogenous effects of power – both the ‘inspector’ and the inmates in the 
‘cells’ are constantly watched.65 Bentham emphasised the importance of seeing 
without being seen for the inspectors and the overall safeguard of equal treatment of 
the inmates as a consequence of this visibility.66  
Bentham wrote about four, somewhat different types of Panopticons.67 
However, in this article, we will focus only on the first version of the ‘prison-
panopticon’ and Foucault’s interpretation thereof through the concept of 
panopticism.68 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault wrote that the Panopticon was a 
machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheral ring, one is totally 
seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being 
seen.69 However, in later interviews he stressed that the overseer also cannot escape 
                                                
63 Bentham, supra note 13 at 139; Foucault, supra note 9 at 146–148. 
64 Foucault, supra note 9 at 71. 
65 Foucault, supra note 1 at 202; Clegg, supra note 47 at 35. 
66 Bentham, supra note 13 at 23, 29–30. 
67 Anne Brunon-Ernst, “Deconstructing Panopticism into the Plural Panopticons” in Anne Brunon-
Ernst, ed, Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2012) 17 at 21–22. 
68 See Leroy’s analysis on the relevance of Foucault’s interpretation to other versions Marie-Laure 
Leroy, “Transparency and Politics: The Reversed Panopticon as a Response to Abuse of Power” in 
Anne Brunon-Ernst, ed, Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon (Farnham: 
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from the structure of the Panopticon.70 In the Panopticon each person, depending on 
his place, is watched by all or some others.71 This power is not identified as resting 
with an individual who possesses or exercises such power by right of birth; rather 
power has become a machine that no one owns.72 
Bentham’s idea of the Panopticon was originally constructed to create an 
instrument of discipline enabling the ruler to perfect his control over the dominated. 
Foucault’s perception of this machine within the context of power/knowledge and the 
emphasis on the mutual visibility of both the ‘guard’ and the ‘inmates’ emphasised the 
fact that the control was exercised from within the social body and not from ‘the 
monarch’ above. In Foucault’s later writings, he shifted his emphasis to stressing that 
‘where there is power, there is resistance’. No single individual is in total control in 
the Panopticon as even the ‘inmates’ have a role in the control over the ‘guard’.73 The 
power of the ‘inmates’ arises from the knowledge they possess as a result of the 
visibility of the ‘guard’. It is this awareness of his visibility that limits the total control 
of the ‘guard’ and hence subverts and limits his own power. This is not to contend that 
the power of the ‘inmates’ is equal or even comparable to the ‘guard’, but rather point 
out that they possess certain, though limited, power as a result of the structure of the 
Panopticon. Same is the power of the occupied population against the occupying 
power – video cameras and surveillance enables them to create spreadable knowledge 
of violations, the potential negative effect of which limits the total control of the 
occupying power. In order to provide credibility to the potential threat of the 
knowledge of the ‘inmates’, within the Panopticon structure, there is still a need for a 
responsible external power (similarly to the eventual indictment in the Abu Rahma 
                                                
70 Foucault, supra note 9 at 156. 
71 Ibid at 158. 
72 Ibid at 156. 
73 Keith Douglas Smith, Liberalism, Surveillance, and Resistance: Indigenous Communities in Western 
Canada, 1877-1927 (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2009) at 5–6. 
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case), but in the reality of a world where the ‘panoptic’ structures are everywhere, the 
very potential of visibility often suffices. 
The major effect of the Panopticon was to induce in the inmate/ mad man/ 
soldier/ schoolboy/ worker a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power. In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle 
that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have 
before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being observed at any single 
moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so.74 
The invention of the Panopticon had the peculiarity of being utilized first of all 
on a local level, in schools, barracks and hospitals. However, for Bentham, Panoptism 
was a set of principles applicable to all forms of social governance.75 This was where 
the experiment of integral surveillance was carried out.76 Surveillance in its modern 
form represents yet another step in the perfection of the social Panoptism. The 
creation of systems of social order that are self-regulating and internalized among 
those regulated, represent a further shifting of coercive power from the hierarchical 
and external — the state, the police, and the institution to the social and internal — 
the individual and the private members of society.77 The effect of the Panopticon over 
time is that the threat of constant observation leads to internalization and reduces the 
need for formal discipline so that, finally, ”discipline, regulation and surveillance are 
taken for granted”.  78 It is these processes of internalization which bring us to claim 
that the mere awareness of potential of exposure, increase the power of the ‘inmates’ 
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resulting from knowledge of any transgressions by the ‘guards’. Therefore the mere 
awareness of the possibility of being videotaped by B’Tselem’s cameras spurs 
soldiers and their commanders to self-regulate and discipline themselves in order to 
prevent the creation (and mainly publication) of new negative images similar to the 
ones which lied in the basis of the Abu Rahma incident. The added credibility, due to 
the actual indictments of the filmed soldiers, increases the probability of potential 
penalties, further disciplines and, in turn, reinforces the internalization of the very 
ideas of discipline by the individuals. 
In organizational studies, these effects of the Panopticon were connected with 
the principle of ‘continuous observation made possible by technical arrangements’, 
where the system essentially makes the individual ‘want’ what the system needs to 
perform well.79 As Clegg noted, since the Weberian research, ‘obedience’ was central 
to the analysis of the production of power in organizations. 80 The lessons of the 
Panopticon were also learned and implemented when constructing and managing 
organizations and factories.81 B’Tselem ‘Shooting Back’ project tried to utilise these 
effects in order to minimize the occurrence of instances of Israeli violations of 
international humanitarian law in the OT by revealing them to the Israeli and 
international public.82 
IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AS PART OF AN 
ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE 
Servan said that  
                                                
79 Ibid at 3. 
80 Clegg, supra note 47 at 38. 
81 Alan McKinlay & Phil Taylor, “Through the Looking Glass: Foucault and the Politics of Production” 
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[w]hen you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, 
you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their 
masters. A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true 
politician binds them even more strongly by the chains of their own ideas; it is 
at the stable point of reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link is at all 
the stronger in that we do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be 
our own work; despair and time eat away the bonds of iron and steel, but they 
are powerless against the habitual union of ideas, they can only tighten it still 
more; and on the soft fibres of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the 
soundest of Empires.83 
In order to assess whether transnational actors such as the NGO B’Tselem can 
play an active role in enforcing compliance with international law, we have to revisit 
the tenets of power and its enforcement. Franck defined legitimacy as ”a property of a 
rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has 
come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
right process.”84 Legitimacy is a component of power, since it enables one to achieve 
its goals by means other than coercion alone. It is a significant cost-effective measure 
as it ”has the power to pull toward compliance those who cannot be compelled”.85  
Foucault said that power cannot be held for long by purely repressive 
measures. Perhaps, one of the mechanisms to overcome this is legitimacy. Legitimacy 
lies in the basis of the pull towards compliance, ”it is the legitimacy of the rules which 
conduces to their being respected”.  86 One should, however, be careful not to relate to 
legitimacy as a neutral concept. The question of what is legitimate is the result of 
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power struggles87. It may derive from ideology or local socioeconomic or political 
interests which brought a certain conception of morals and ethics in a given society.  88   
The presence of media-giants and NGOs, limits the freedom of states to use 
military means as they may see fit. The quest for legitimacy, which can be gained by 
complying with international law,89 is affecting the assertion of power by the state. 
Power is the response to the assertion of power by others.90 Therefore, by revealing 
new issues and hence changing available knowledge transnational actors restrain and 
reconstruct the power of states. 
Lipschutz believed that NGOs redefine the borders between public and private 
spheres.91 In many campaigns organized by NGOs, issues that once were considered 
private, are now becoming a part of the public debate, and matters that were in the 
past an object for public influence are now being advocated to be left in the private 
sphere. B’Tselem’s camera distribution project presents a case where publicised 
knowledge of a situation empowers the weak, in this case, the occupied civil 
population.92 This knowledge is power, as it empowers the civilians and restrains the 
power of the occupying state. The state and particularly its armed forces, have to 
reconsider their actions, as violations of the law of occupation are no longer regarded 
as the state’s private domain, outside the remit of domestic and international scrutiny. 
With the infrastructure present in the contemporary global world and due to the ”CNN 
                                                
87 On the concepts of ‘legitimate power’ and ‘illegitimate power’ in organizational theories see Clegg, 
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effect”,93 separate incidents in small peripheral villages, may well become headline 
news all over the world and influence state behaviour. 
According to Backer, compliance depends on both observation and the 
knowledge of being observed. Law in this sense can be understood as a framework for 
surveillance, understanding surveillance as information gathering, assessment, and 
even judgment in the eyes of the beholder. Surveillance can thus be understood as a 
new form of lawmaking, through which the old boundaries between public and 
private, national and transnational, are made irrelevant.94 It represents a shifting of 
coercive power from the external and the hierarchically higher - the state, the police, 
and the institution to the internal - the individual and the private. Surveillance has 
accordingly morphed from being an element of governance to becoming the basis of 
governance itself.  95 In its modern form, surveillance represents yet another step in the 
perfection of social Panoptism.96 
B’Tselem’s ‘Shooting Back’ project is just that. Bentham’s two principles of 
power, visibility and unverifiability, are well exercised in the project. Once the fact of 
the existence of the project has been published, soldiers serving in the OT must now 
be aware of the possibility of their actions being visible. These actions can now be 
visible not only by the eyes of the local population that has no significant power 
against the army, or solely by journalists whose access to high-conflict areas may be 
restricted, but by the Israeli and international public, as well as by the enforcement 
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bodies not present at the scene. Illegal and criminal acts, or acts that can be portrayed 
as legitimate when edited to reflect the desired narrative, can now be video-
documented by the local population present at the scene.97 Particularly in a state of 
belligerent occupation, where an army has to handle complex situations in highly-
populated areas, the visibility effect is intensified. It is important to remember the 
legal context of Israel’s occupation of the ‘occupied’ territories of the West Bank: 
there is little doubt that Israel is occupying these territories since the war of 1967. The 
ICJ confirmed Israel’s position as ‘occupying’ power in its 2004 (non-binding) 
advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.98 This legal view is not shared by the Israeli government, 
which uses the term ‘disputed territories’ instead99 while –significantly- applying 
military law to the civilian ‘Palestinian inhabitants’, which reinforces the 
“occupation” view. Consequently, the Israeli Supreme Court seems to follow 
international legal opinion, whereas Israel holds “the West Bank in belligerent 
occupation since 1967”.100 The court also made it clear that the rules of IHL (LOAC) 
were to apply.101 
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Our discussion of enforcement and visibility has to be seen in the context of 
this backdrop of the legal and political debate revolving around the nature of Israel’s 
occupation of land outside the Green line. Since a significant part of the enforcement 
of the public order by the occupying power occurs in or around civil villages and 
towns, the illegitimate actions occurring in this context can now be made visible more 
easily. The fact that cameras are given to a relatively large number of families in each 
area, intensifies the effect of visibility. The mere presence of cameras and even the 
filming of incidents cannot be outlawed as perhaps desired by the army. Therefore 
even if the army is aware of the source of the filming, it does not usually have the 
operational capabilities and legal authority to limit the movement of that individual or 
family. Unlike pure eyewitness testimonies that can be easily discredited and are more 
difficult to be communicated to the global public opinion, video footage is easily 
transferable, and leaves a distinct, while subjective, account of such an incident. Thus 
emphasising the saying – ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’.102   
The second principle of un-verifiability is also significantly present in this 
example. The filming of an incident is not done from an identifiable position, as in 
cases when journalists are allowed to accompany the ground forces as ’embedded 
journalists’ or to document from a specific observation point. Moreover, the army 
doesn’t know which families or individuals have cameras and which do not. The 
emphasis on ‘passive image making’ intensifies the vagueness of the source of 
surveillance. Even if a soldier knows who owns a camera, he/she doesn’t know if at 
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any particular moment that individual is operating the camera, if the camera has not 
been passed on to somebody else, or whether the camera is at all functional. 
Foucault encouraged others to adapt his work to fit their interest as he himself 
had done with Nietzsche and others.103 B’Tselem’s camera distribution project 
exemplifies the potential panopticon structure in the law of occupation. The 
traditional conception of the law of occupation is that the state is responsible for 
maintaining public order, and it is up for the state itself, or to other states in some 
cases, to prosecute soldiers who commit crimes and other violations of the Laws of 
War.104 Therefore power is experienced in a traditional way, which enshrines the 
public-private divide, and therefore makes the state more powerful by alleviating its 
status as supreme to all other private actors. This conception requires constant 
surveillance of the civil population by the army. The ‘Shooting Back’ project 
advances a second set of surveillance – that of the army by the civil population, 
facilitated by the availability of resources of NGOs and technologies of the media. 
The situation therefore becomes what Foucault referred to as a ‘diabolic aspect’ of 
panoptism – panopticon ‘is a machine in which everyone is caught, those who 
exercise power, just as much as those over whom it is exercised’.105 Power is no 
longer identified with a single individual (or authority), everyone has a role of an 
overseer in the machine.106 The army’s duty in the territories is to maintain public 
order and for that they are the overseers over the civil population. The civil population 
is, perhaps for the first time, able to truly complete the structure of the Panopticon: as 
now they have also become actors who oversee the actions of the army, and its 
compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL).  
                                                
103 Knights, supra note 8 at 178. 
104 1949 Geneva Fourth Convention, supra note 99, paragraph 146–149. 
105 Foucault, supra note 9 at 156. 
106 Ibid at 152–156. 
26  
 
This developing panoptic structure, which has the potential to influence the 
balance of power between the strong and the weak, constitutes a significant evolution 
for the enforcement of international law in general and IHL in particular. In line with 
scholarship on compliance,107 the visibility in the panopticon, inherent to its structure, 
restricts not only the freedom of the ‘inmates’ in the cells as the weak, but of the 
‘guard’ as the strong.108 . By increasing visibility in the structure of the Panopticon, 
the existence of violations becomes visible as well. The structure of the Panopticon 
encourages the ‘guard’ to step away from misconduct, as it would be visible to all. 
Similarly, in the case of the ‘Shooting Back’ project, the presence of cameras provides 
the enforcement agencies and the judiciary with evidence required for conducting 
effective investigations and bringing successfully disciplinary and criminal charges 
against transgressors. This positive assessment seems to correspond with the 
responses B’Tselem received from the army and the police, which utilise the 
information provided by B’Tselem as evidence in their investigations into acts of 
misconduct and criminal acts.109  
 The effect of visibility is not limited to the particular violator and his actions. 
The greater level of transparency brought by the video coverage increases the overall 
cost of non-compliance for the state as a whole. The spread of cameras in a globally 
oriented society aids in the monitoring of potential violations and facilitates the wider 
distribution of such knowledge. Therefore, the state has to improve its procedures and 
safeguard their enforcement in order to reduce any possible transgressions by 
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individual violators. The state as a whole may become immediately subject to global 
scrutiny due to the transgressions of one individual soldier. Hence, the cost of non-
compliance is escalated due to a larger risk of documented non-compliance, potential 
civil damage claims and litigation as well as the potential damage to the occupying 
power’s overall legitimacy and public image.  
As outlined above, legitimacy plays an important role in the exercise of power. 
Illegitimate and purely repressive use of power leads people to oppose it. Occupation 
itself is mostly considered a factual, rather than a normative phenomenon.110 It is 
considered to be only temporary in nature, a limited period of time when IHL has to 
be observed, and at the end of which, the territory and its resources should be returned 
to the original sovereign. Positive public opinion, both domestic and international, is 
one of the main sources of legitimacy for an occupying power today. The appearance 
of video footage that questions the level of compliance with IHL in the occupied 
territory may actually delegitimize the occupation both internationally and 
domestically; a development which in turn decreases the power of the occupying 
state.111 
It seems that in the case of B’Tselem’s camera distribution project, the NGO, 
using technology provided by media corporations, empowered the local population by 
providing it with means to become an overseer of the level of compliance of the army 
and border police with IHL rules. Transnational actors in this case may have altered 
the balance of power, by spreading knowledge and therefore creating the conditions 
for a Panopticon structure.  
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International law in general, could be changing through the introduction of 
panoptic structures in a global, transnational, technology oriented society. Bentham 
said that the structure of the Panopticon would be applicable to ”all establishments 
whatsoever, in which within a space not too large to be covered or commanded by 
buildings, a number of persons are meant to be kept under inspection”.112 The spread 
of easily accessible information, facilitated by the presence of available technology 
like the cameras provided by B’Tselem, or Twitter updates from the streets of Cairo 
during the so called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, serve as both the ‘buildings’ of inspection 
in the structure of the Panopticon, while at the same time, possessing the capability to 
bring knowledge to every corner of the world. The question whether rules of 
international law are adhered to is not monitored solely from a single location alone 
but rather each camera becomes a monitoring instrument and platform providing 
knowledge and limiting the ability of the transgressor to violate the rules without 
being exposed. 
The case of the ‘Shooting Back’ project presents one of the examples where 
transnational private actors are increasingly involved in achieving overall compliance 
with international law. The case we studied is perhaps the most crystallised version of 
the indirect role and impact of transnational actors on such compliance. In this case 
B’Tselem did not choose simply to pressure the Israeli government to investigate the 
alleged violations reported by the local population. Rather it chose to provide the state 
with knowledge that affected its use of power, at the same time empowering the local 
population. B’Tselem provided the state with knowledge that it couldn’t have 
received in other ways. Although states are responsible for the implementation and 
enforcement of the law of occupation, they are at times unable to monitor effectively 
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certain areas and are thus depending on assistance from other actors. In our global 
age, such a role and function can be best fulfilled by NGOs and the media. Perhaps 
this could also be the new focus of the question of compliance with international law 
in areas of limited statehood.113 
V. CONCLUSION 
Non-state transnational actors are not the ultimate solution to the problem of ensuring 
compliance in international law. Perhaps they are not even a good solution – they may 
have a democratic deficit, they are dependent on external funding, they have their own 
partisan interests, they are highly politicized, or designed to maximize their profit.114 
However, they are already influencing compliance, and their role should be properly 
analysed and understood before being dismissed.  
The recognition that NGOs and the media have significant powers and do 
affect international policy is not new.115 However, the mechanisms in which they 
employ their power have been underexplored. B’Tselem’s camera distribution project 
presents an interesting example of the way that NGOs can empower the weaker side 
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by providing them with an opportunity to publicize knowledge. B’Tselem’s project 
eventually promoted a situation where, in Hebron today, people prefer to walk with 
cameras, as they feel more protected.  116 This empowerment also affords great powers 
to the NGO itself. As Gross described, he is now often being approached by top level 
military and police officers who are seeking information and knowledge from his 
organization whenever an incident occurs.117 Being committed to universal moral 
values and in light of the centricity of the value and dignity of human rights to the 
IDF,118 the knowledge provided by organisations like B’Tselem enables it to function 
better and also its well-developed internal investigation mechanisms to work more 
efficiently. Furthermore, the IDF itself is training combat soldiers to carry cameras in 
order to present its side of the story.119 
The case of B’Tselem’s camera distribution project was not selected for being 
the typical NGO enforcement advocacy project, but rather for its uniqueness and 
innovation. The concept of this project erodes yet another aspect of sovereignty. 
Traditional formal sovereignty rested on principles of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of another state and of sovereign equality, where it is eventually each 
state that decided how to deal with the population of the enemy, and with its own 
troops that defied the laws of war. These concepts were narrowed down with time by 
clarification and eventually the codification of the universal laws of war, the 
establishment of greater enforcement mechanisms by international bodies (human 
rights courts, human rights committees and international criminal tribunals), and the 
acquiescence (even though restrictive) to extend universal criminal jurisdiction of 
states over the crimes of individual perpetrators from other states (which incorporates 
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the idea that one state can have a moral virtue over another). B’Tselem’s project 
enables us to have another look at the change that is taking place in the structure of 
power/knowledge in our globalised transnational society. Private transnational actors 
supply information and knowledge to all those actively seeking it. The state is no 
longer the sole source and master of knowledge as it feels increasingly unable to filter 
and control the information it wishes to publicise. The relevant structures, as well as 
our understanding of them should be adapted to better reflect this process of 
transition. Is this a further erosion of the formal concepts of sovereignty, or is this 
merely a technological change that will eventually cause the states to restrict the flow 
of information through legal and technical counter-measures? The flow of information 
and knowledge opens the door for new forms and mechanisms which may eventually 
increase the chance of enforcing international law and the compliance with its rules.  
Enforcement is impossible without knowledge. Even if there is a will for 
compliance, the practical inability to gather knowledge about violations, at times 
prevents potential compliance. Gathering and transmitting knowledge, as presented by 
the ‘Shooting Back’ project, can be a role for transnational actors in this structure. 
The wide dissemination of cameras in high conflict areas, conjointly with the strategy 
to use passive image making, allow the widest array of coverage of the situation, 
unachievable by traditional means. ‘Shooting back’ simply provides knowledge and 
this is perhaps its greatest achievement to date. 
